



Forthcoming in Philosophy 
Making Sense of  Shame 
He groaned at his disgrace 
Unfolding his ill-fame 
And blood suffused his face 
When he showed his mark of  shame. 
  (Sir Gawain and The Green Knight, p. 114) 
§1. Introduction 
Shame is naturally thought of  as having two dimensions. On the one hand, 
it is thought to be a value-oriented emotion which involves feeling oneself  
to be shameful in some way, and therefore to fall short of  some normative 
standard. This standard could be moral, a fact emphasised by the common 
claim that shame is a ‘moral emotion’, but it could also be aesthetic or 
epistemic.  On the other hand, shame is commonly thought to be a ‘social 1
emotion’ which manifests our concern with our social relations, with 
honour and ‘ill-fame’.   This is reflected in the characteristic tendency of  the 2
subject of  shame to avoid eye contact and to defer to others, or to withdraw 
from social interaction altogether. 
I have two aims in this paper. The first is to show that the task of  
understanding the relationship between these two dimensions of  shame is 
 For the claim that shame is a ‘moral emotion’, see Taylor (1985, p. 54), Rawls (1999, p. 389), 1
Wollheim (1999), Levinas (2003, p. 63) and Calhoun (2004).
 See Maibom (2010), Zahavi (2014), Tomasello (2019, p. 283) and O’Brien (2020, p. 553)2
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more challenging than it might have initially appeared. Beginning from the 
widespread assumption that shame is other-oriented insofar as it manifests 
our concern primarily with the way we appear to others, I argue that we face 
a challenge in understanding shame in a way that satisfactorily integrates its 
value-oriented and other-oriented dimensions. More specifically, I argue that 
an intuitive line of  thought which takes seriously shame’s value-oriented 
dimension leads naturally to ‘The Self-Evaluation View’, a view which I 
argue faces a serious challenge in accommodating shame’s other-oriented 
dimension. This, in turn, can push us towards ‘The Social Evaluation View’, 
a view which faces the opposite challenge of  accommodating the value-
oriented dimension of  shame. Finally I argue that an attempt to chart a 
middle-course between these two extremes which leaves in tact the 
assumption that shame manifests a concern primarily with the way we 
appear to others is unsatisfactory (§2). 
The second aim of  this paper is to suggest that this assumption is not 
mandatory. Instead, I outline an account of  shame as manifesting our 
concern primarily to connect with others and only secondarily with the way 
we appear to others. On this basis, the other-oriented dimension of  shame 
is elucidated in terms of  a specific form of  merited avoidance or rejection 
(§3). The resulting account, I contend, provides a more satisfying 
integration of  the two dimensions of  shame than either of  the alternatives 
considered in §2. 
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§2. Shame and Approbation 
2.1. On ‘seeing oneself  through another’s eyes’ 
The subject of  shame is sometimes described as seeing themselves ‘through 
another’s eyes’ (e.g. Taylor 1985, p. 57). This metaphor suggests an 
encounter of  the following form. Just as you might see yourself  reflected in 
a mirror as you appear from another spatial perspective, so when you see 
another you might recognise, from the orientation of  their gaze and the 
expression on their face, that they see you in a particular evaluative light, as 
you appear from their evaluative perspective.  
This naturally suggests an understanding of  the other-oriented 
dimension in terms of  one’s awareness of, and concern with, those 
evaluatively-laden psychological states of  which one is the object. That is, 
with the way one appears to others, perceptually or doxastically, and more 
generally, one’s reputation. Our susceptibility to shame, then, is the product 
of  our nature as social creatures that want to be thought well of—to be held 
in ‘approbation’—by others of  our kind. 
This form of  interpersonal awareness might vary across a number of  
dimensions. For example, it might concern the way one is evaluated by an 
actual person who is present or an actual person who is not present. 
Alternatively, it might concern the way an actual person would evaluate one 
if  they were fully apprised of  the relevant facts. Finally, as Williams (1993, p. 
82) observes, although there are experiences of  shame which do not involve 
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an actual evaluator, many experiences of  this sort will nevertheless involve 
an imaginary evaluator.  
This is the most common way of  interpreting the other-oriented 
dimension of  shame in the philosophical literature, and it forms the basis 
for a suspicion that shame ought not to play an important role in adult 
ethical life. As Williams (1993, p. 77-8) observes, insofar as shame is thought 
to involve one’s ‘losing face’ in the eyes of  others, it is sometimes accused 
of  being a superficial, heteronomous and narcissistic emotion. These three 
worries are interconnected. Shame is thought to be superficial insofar as it is 
concerned with the way one appears regardless of  how one actually is. It is 
thought to be narcissistic insofar as it is to be fixated on one’s social image 
rather than the putatively ethically relevant facts about the situation. And, 
finally, it is thought to be heteronomous insofar as it shifts our attention 
away from our own autonomous assessment of  ourselves and what we 
ought to do to the appraisals and expectations of  others.  3
Each of  these suspicions naturally leads to the thought that although 
shame might have a place in the ethical life of  the young and immature, 
rendering them receptive to ethical instruction, it has no place in the life of  
a mature ethical agent (e.g. Calhoun 2004).  As Burnyeat (1980, p. 78) says, it 4
is at best ‘the semivirtue of  the learner’. 
 See also Calhoun (2004, p. 128),  Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni (2011, p. 35-6) and Harcourt 3
(2016).
 The same thought is expressed, for different reasons, by Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 1128b10).4
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2.2. The Self-Evaluation View 
These suspicions embody assumptions about shame which can be 
contested. In particular, they make it overwhelmingly natural to respond by 
emphasising the value-oriented dimension of  shame. A natural way to do 
this is to defend the idea that shame is a form of  adverse self-evaluation 
which involves something like the thought that one falls short of  some 
value or standard (e.g. Rawls 1999, p. 387-391; Taylor 1985; Bartky 1990). 
Shame, so envisaged, involves thinking or feeling oneself  to be a particular 
way and therefore need not necessarily involve the kind of  concern with the 
way one appears to others which is the basis of  the charges mentioned 
above. 
This way of  thinking about shame can seem plausible if  we consider the 
following line of  thought. We might think that in order for the other’s 
evaluation of  me to make me feel ashamed of  myself, as opposed to merely 
making me feel upset, it must make me feel myself  to be shameful in some 
way. But this would be to in some sense take myself  to have some negatively 
valenced property which makes appropriate my feeling of  shame and the 
other’s negative evaluation. Taking myself  to have such a property, however, 
arguably involves the incorporation of  the other’s evaluation of  me into my 
own self-conception, and therefore involves me evaluating myself  in 
precisely the way the other evaluates me (Taylor 1985, p. 57-9; Bartky 1990, 
p. 85). Thus, Taylor suggests, Sartre’s voyeur feels ashamed upon being 
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caught in the act of  peeping through a keyhole because he recognises that 
he is the vulgar person he is seen to be (Sartre 2018, p. 308, p. 357-8).  
2.3. Self-Evaluation and the Other-Oriented Dimension of  Shame 
This account enables one to respond to the normative critique of  shame 
suggested in §2.1 by denying that shame manifests an undue concern with 
the way one appears to another. The reason for this is that this account 
envisages shame in such a way that the way one appears to another plays at 
most a causal and epistemic role in the experience of  shame, causing one’s 
experience or providing evidential grounds for the relevant self-evaluation. 
Shame, as such, is not inherently concerned with the way one appears to 
others. What place, then, is there for the other-oriented dimension of  
shame in this account?  
One option would be to insist that the specific form of  self-evaluation 
necessarily involves the thought that one is seen by another in a particular 
kind of  way. The problem with this strategy, however, is that it seems to be 
perfectly possible to feel ashamed of  oneself  when one is alone, without 
thinking or imagining oneself  to be seen in a particular way by another. In 
this vein, O’Hear (1976-1977, p. 77) suggests that ‘it is quite possible to 
think of  people, such as writers or craftsmen, with high standards of  their 
own, feeling shame just because they have let themselves down (not 
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produced a masterpiece), without thinking of  them imagining other 
craftsmen inspecting and condemning their work.’  5
Taylor pursues a different course, claiming that awareness of  the way 
one appears to others, whether actual or imaginary, is not an essential 
component of  shame. However, the idea the idea that shame is inherently 
other-involving can be explained away, insofar as the idea that one is seen is 
a useful metaphorical device for describing ‘the shift in the agent’s 
viewpoint vis-à-vis himself.’ That is, the shift in the agent’s viewpoint from 
their immersed first person perspective to that of  a detached observer, 
seeing themselves from the latter perspective as being inferior to how they 
assumed themselves to be from the former perspective (Taylor 1985, p. 66).  
However, this suggestion fails to do justice to the natural thought that 
shame is other-oriented. To see why, let’s consider Nathaniel Hawthorne’s 
exploration of  shame in The Scarlet Letter. This novel recounts the aftermath 
of  an affair between Hester Prynne and a man whose identity is unknown 
to the public but who we discover to be the Reverend Arthur Dimmesdale. 
While Arthur is beloved by his parishioners, Hester is persecuted by them. 
Day by day she is subjected to a routine of  shaming-punishments, most 
notably being made to wear the scarlet letter as a badge of  her shame.  
 cf. Taylor (1985, p. 58ff) and Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni (2011, p. 145-152). Few insist on the 5
strong claim that shame necessarily involves the conscious thought or imagination of  another 
who plays the role of  an observer. This view is sometimes attributed to Williams, for example by 
Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni (2011, p. 32-3). However, his claim is weaker than this:  
Even if shame and its motivations always involve in some way or other an idea of  the gaze 
of  another, it is important that for many of  its operations the imagined gaze of  an imagined 
other will do. (Williams 1993, p. 82, emphasis added)  
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Insofar as Hester seldom contests the evaluations of  the parishioners, 
her shame might initially seem amenable to The Self-Evaluation View. It is 
also plausible that she is sometimes subject to the shift in perspective Taylor 
describes. She goes about her life, immersed in her charitable activities and 
might even, for a short time, forget about her ‘shameful past’, only to be 
reminded of  it when another’s gaze forces her to imagine how she appears 
from a detached perspective. What is unconvincing, however, is the idea that 
this exhausts the other-oriented dimension of  shame. Consider, for 
instance, the following passage:  
Another peculiar torture was felt in the gaze of  a new eye. When 
strangers looked curiously at the scarlet letter — and none ever 
failed to do so, — they branded it afresh into Hester’s soul… But 
then again, an accustomed eye likewise had its own anguish to 
inflict. From first to last, in short, Hester Prynne had always this 
dreadful agony in feeling a human eye upon the token; the spot 
never grew callous; it seemed, on the contrary, to grow more 
sensitive with each daily torture. (Hawthorne 2007, p. 69)  
Two points can be made in connection with this example.  
First, on Taylor’s interpretation, we should think of  the other’s gaze as 
inducing shame in Hester by causing her to take an observer’s perspective 
on herself. But the salient object of  Hester’s attention in this example is not 
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herself, as seen from the other’s third person perspective. Rather, the 
explicit object of  her attention is the other’s shame-inducing gaze. Her 
consciousness of  herself  transparent in the sense that it consists in her 
attending, not to herself  from an observer’s perspective, but to those 
reactions of  others which she experiences as directed ‘at me’, as inducing or 
intensifying her shame.  
Second, if  the putatively other-oriented dimension of  shame is merely 
incidental to the experience of  shame, what would explain the fact that the 
characteristic expressions of  shame, such as the desire to avoid eye contact 
and social interaction, and the desire that others forget about one’s shameful 
revelations, are other-directed? It is true that it might be easier to regulate 
one’s shame by trying to forget about it and that these acts of  avoidance 
could be thought of  as a means of  facilitating this. The problem with this 
suggestion, however, is that it treats so much of  what is essential to Hester’s 
shame as merely incidental. If  Hester would like others to forget about her 
shameful past, it is clear that her reason for doing so would be so as to 
enable her to establish a more desirable place in her community. Consider 
the following passage:  
In her intercourse with the society… there was nothing that made 
her feel as if  she belonged to it. Every gesture, every word, and 
even the silence of  those with whom she came in contact implied 
and often expressed that she was banished, and as much alone as 
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if  she inhabited another sphere... The poor, as we have already 
said, whom she sought out to be the objects of  her bounty, often 
reviled the hand that was stretched forth to succor them. Dames 
of  elevated rank, likewise, whose doors she entered in the way of  
her occupation, were accustomed to distil drops of  bitterness into 
her heart; sometimes through that alchemy of  quiet malice, by 
which women can concoct a subtle poison from ordinary trifles; 
and sometimes, also, by a coarser expression, that fell upon the 
sufferer’s defenceless breast like a rough blow upon an ulcerated 
wound. (Hawthorne 2007, p. 67-68)  
This passage suggests that Hester’s shame is other-oriented insofar as it’s 
concerned with interpersonal rejection. When others look at the scarlet 
letter, she is conscious of  their gaze as expressing their rejection of  her, 
their desire to distance themselves from her. No wonder, then, that shame 
might therefore lead one to avoid social contact altogether. Often it is less 
painful to avoid interaction altogether than to put oneself  out there only to 
be rejected.  
The Self-Evaluation View might seek to accommodate these cases by 
suggesting that Hester adversely evaluates herself  for being rejected. This 
proposal falls short of  capturing the inherently other-oriented dimension of  
shame, however, since although it treats rejection as the grounds for this 
particular experience of  shame, it shies away from the claim that shame is 
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inherently concerned with social rejection. This view allows that shame can 
be felt on other grounds, and when it is, it lacks an other-oriented 
dimension. 
If  this is right, then The Self-Evaluation View faces a challenge in 
explaining the natural idea that shame is inherently other-oriented, and 
therefore in explaining the natural thought that it is an emotion that is 
peculiar to self-conscious social animals like us. For all that has been said, 
shame, as it is understood by The Self-Evaluation View, might be possessed 
by an utterly asocial value-oriented agent, one which is utterly indifferent to 
eye contact and interpersonal interaction, and which is concerned with the 
way it is evaluated by others simply as a source of  evidence for its own 
autonomous self-evaluation. 
2.4. The Social-Evaluation View 
These considerations might lead us to rethink our initial concession that 
shame necessarily involves adverse self-evaluation. Instead, we might 
suggest that shame is an experience of  adverse social evaluation; that is, an 
experience of  being adversely evaluated by others, whether actual or 
imaginary (Calhoun 2004; Maibom 2010). A view of  this sort faces two 
challenges, each of  which is connected to the considerations that initially led 
us towards The Self-Evaluation View.  
First, though this account allows that shame is oriented to value insofar 
as it is oriented to the evaluations characteristic of  others in our community, 
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when we are ashamed of  ourselves, we feel ourselves to be, as opposed to 
merely appearing to be, shameful. In §2.2 this led us to find attractive the idea 
that shame involves the incorporation of  the other’s perspective, and from 
there to The Self-Evaluation View. The Social-Evaluation View, by contrast, 
denies that shame requires any form of  self-evaluation. In doing so, it incurs 
the obligation to explain the phenomena which led us to say that feeling 
ashamed of  oneself  is importantly unlike being upset by the other’s opinion 
of  one insofar as it involves feeling oneself  to be shameful. This is ‘The 
Explanatory Challenge’.  
Second, this account rejects the idea shame is an autonomous response 
to the way one is. But this is what enabled The Self-Evaluation View to 
defend shame against the charge that it is a superficial, narcissistic and 
heteronomous emotion that has no place in the life of  a mature ethical 
agent. The Social-Evaluation View therefore owes us a response to these 
charges. We can call this ‘The Normative Challenge’.  
2.5. The Social-Evaluation View and the Value-Oriented Dimension of  Shame 
Calhoun (2004) provides an interesting response to The Normative 
Challenge and, in the course of  doing so, can be interpreted as providing 
the resources for a potential response to The Explanatory Challenge.  
According to Calhoun, it is a sign of  ‘moral maturity’ to feel shame in 
response to another’s disapproval, even when we think their disapproval is 
mistaken. The reason for this is that we have good reason to give ‘practical 
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weight’ the evaluations of  others when these evaluations reflect a view of  us 
which is representative of  the opinions of  our co-participants in some 
moral practice. These evaluations ought to be given practical weight because 
they define ‘who one is’ within this shared moral practice. This view is 
summarised in the following paragraph:  
Shaming criticisms work by impressing upon the person that she 
has disappointed not just one individual’s expectations but what 
some “we” expected of  her… The power to shame is a function 
of  our sharing a moral practice with the shamer and recognizing 
that the shamer’s opinion expresses a representative viewpoint 
within that practice. The shamer’s opinion tells us who we are for 
any number of  co-participants within a social practice of  morality 
that we take ourselves to be a part of. Shaming criticisms have, in 
this sense, practical weight. (Calhoun 2004, p. 140-1)  
We can agree with Calhoun that a mature moral agent, insofar as they seek 
to live a life with others in their community, will give weight to the opinions 
of  others. This will have as a consequence that they will be vulnerable to 
feel upset, displeased and uncomfortable when others try to shame them by 
expressing disapproval of  them, regardless of  whether they feel this 
criticism to be appropriate. This does not entail, however, that it is 
appropriate for an agent to feel ashamed of  themselves in response to 
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disapproval regardless of  whether they take this disapproval to be 
appropriate. And, in fact, we have good reason to resist that idea. For what 
it is to feel ashamed of  oneself  is to feel oneself  to be shameful, and if  the 
subject takes this disapproval to be inappropriate, they will deny that they 
are shameful in the relevant respect. They will take themselves to have 
nothing to be ashamed of  and conclude, correctly, that any such feeling of  
shame would be appropriate in this instance. 
One response that could be made on behalf  of  Calhoun would be to say 
that there is a sense in which a subject can take themselves to be a shameful 
person, even if  they disagree with the other’s disapproval. Recall that 
Calhoun suggests that we can appropriately feel ashamed of  ourselves in 
response to the shaming-criticism of  another because this criticism is 
expressive of  the representative viewpoint of  our moral practice, and 
therefore ‘tells us who we are for any number of  co-participants’ (Calhoun 
2004, p. 140-1). It might be suggested that, in such a case, being aware of  
oneself  as adversely evaluated from a representative standpoint makes one 
aware not merely of  how one appears to others, but also with the shameful 
person one is in one’s social world.  
There are at least three problems with Calhoun’s account, so understood. 
The first is that, without further argument, it can appear to consist in a 
merely verbal manoeuvre. To say this is ‘the shameful person one is for 
these others’ is just to say that one appears to be a shameful person to these 
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people.  It therefore brings us no closer to capturing the value-oriented 6
dimension of  shame. When we feel ashamed of  ourselves we do not think 
of  ourselves as merely appearing to be a shameful person to others. This, 
after all, is something we might respond to by merely feeling upset. Rather, 
as I have emphasised, when we feel ashamed of  ourselves we feel ourselves 
to be shameful in some respect.  
The second problem is posed by the phenomenon of  ‘secret shame’. To 
illustrate this difficulty, we can return to The Scarlet Letter. The case of  
Arthur Dimmesdale contrasts with that of  Hester Prynne. Whereas Hester’s 
shame is felt before the public gaze, Arthur’s shame is suffered in private; 
whereas she suffers ill-fame, he enjoys public approbation. His shame is 
nevertheless, deeply other-oriented, as can be seen in the following speech 
he addresses to Hester:  
Happy are you, Hester, that wear the scarlet letter openly upon 
your bosom! Mine burns in secret! Thou little knowest what a 
relief  it is, after the torment of  a seven years’ cheat, to look into 
an eye that recognizes me for what I am! Had I one friend... to 
whom when sickened with the praises of  all other men, I could 
daily betake myself  and be known as the vilest of  all sinners, 
methinks my soul might keep itself  alive thereby. Even thus much 
 See Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni (2011, p. 37-8) for a similar charge. 6
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of  truth would save me! But now it is all falsehood! — all 
emptiness! — all death! (Hawthorne 2007, p. 150)  
Although Arthur is revered by his community, he feels alienated from it 
insofar as his inclusion is based on an understanding of  him as admirable, 
an understanding he cannot share thinking himself, as he does, the ‘vilest of  
sinners’.  
Calhoun’s account faces a challenge in satisfactorily characterising 
Arthur’s shame. After all, from the actual representative viewpoint of  his 
community (the viewpoint which determines ‘who he is’ in this moral 
practice), he is regarded as a saintlike figure and a boon to the community. 
Moreover, it would be a distortion of  the example to claim that Arthur’s 
shame can be understood as being a shame felt in anticipation of  the person 
he will become once his part in the affair is revealed. His shame is not 
future-oriented in this way: he feels himself  to be shameful, to be the vilest 
of  sinners, and not merely to fear future exposure. Nor can Calhoun 
understand Arthur as imagining being seen by an observer who sees him as 
he sees himself, because this would at best determine ‘who he is’ in some 
imaginary moral practice and not ‘who he is’ in his actual moral practice. By 
the lights of  Calhoun’s view, this will at best make sense of  an imaginary 
feeling of  shame rather than Arthur’s actual feeling of  shame. Finally, 
Calhoun cannot avoid this difficulty by claiming that Arthur sees that he is 
this shameful person, in the sense that this is how he would be seen by 
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others in his community if  his secret were to be exposed. After all, at the 
end of  the novel Arthur does reveal himself  to his community. And just as 
this community interprets Hester’s charitable deeds in a way which confirms 
their preconception of  her as a sinner, so they interpret his revelations in a 
way that confirms their preconception of  him as a saint. It is in this 
connection that Hawthorne writes of  the ‘stubborn fidelity with which a 
man’s friends —and especially a clergyman’s— will sometimes uphold his 
character, when proofs, clear as the mid-day sunshine on the scarlet letter, 
establish him a false and sin-stained creature of  the dust’ (Hawthorne 2007, 
p. 201).  
The final problem concerns the phenomenon of  higher-order shame. In 
Ellison’s Invisible Man, the narrator writes ‘I am not ashamed of  my 
grandparents for having been slaves. I am only ashamed of  myself  for 
having at one time been ashamed’ (Ellison 1953, p. 15). Calhoun seems to 
be committed to understanding the narrator’s past feeling of  shame (of  the 
fact his grandparents were slaves) as appropriate insofar as the belief  that 
being the grandson of  slaves is shameful reflects the representative view of  
his moral practice. But this puts pressure on the more plausible thought that 
his higher-order shame is appropriate. Assuming that he remains within the 
same moral practice, and that the representative views of  this practice have 
not changed, it is either appropriate to feel ashamed of  one’s grandparents 
for having been slaves, in which case his higher-order shame of  having once 
been ashamed of  this is inappropriate; or, it is inappropriate to feel ashamed 
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of  one’s grandparents for having been slaves, in which case is appropriate 
for one to feel higher-order shame in having once felt this. 
A more plausible interpretation of  this kind of  case is available if  we 
retain the idea that feeling ashamed of  oneself  involves feeling oneself  to 
be shameful, and therefore to fall short of  some normative standard. The 
narrator can then be understood as telling us that when he used to be 
ashamed of  himself  for having grandparents who were once slaves, he used 
to feel to be shameful even though he now realises it is not. He has come to 
see that the only shameful thing about his earlier condition was his feeling 
of  shame regarding the fact his grandparents were once slaves.  
2.6. The Challenge 
We seem to face a dilemma. On the one hand, we might try and 
accommodate the value-oriented dimension of  shame by defending a 
version of  The Self-Evaluation View, only to fail to do justice to the other-
oriented dimension of  shame. Or we might begin from the assumption that 
shame is an other-oriented emotion, only to face a challenge in explaining 
the value-oriented dimension of  shame. It is natural at this stage to try and 
find a middle way. 
One clearly unsatisfying way of  attempting do this would be to 
distinguish two species of  shame, ‘moral shame’ and ‘social shame’, and to 
suggest that ‘The Self-Evaluation View’ is true of  the former and ‘The 
Social-Evaluation View’ is true of  the latter. The problem with this 
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suggestion is that paradigmatic cases of  shame are both value-oriented and 
other-oriented.  
A more promising middle way has it that shame constitutively involves 
the judgement that the (actual or imaginary) other’s adverse evaluation of  
one is merited. Unlike The Self-Evaluation View, this suggestion 
acknowledges that shame is inherently other-oriented and, unlike The 
Social-Evaluation View considered earlier, insists that the relevant adverse 
social-evaluation is felt to be merited, thereby acknowledging the value-
oriented dimension of  shame.  
Although this account can seem to blunt the suspicion of  inherent 
heteronomy insofar as the subject is concerned with only those of  the 
other’s evaluations which seem to the subject to be appropriate, this account 
envisages shame in a way that is nevertheless open to the charges of  
narcissism and heteronomy.  
This can be brought out by a parallel with Williams’s (1985) discussion 
of  the description under which a virtuous agent performs virtuous deeds. 
Generally, we think that someone who possesses a virtue, say benevolence, 
does not perform a benevolent act ‘because it’s the virtuous thing to do ’ or 
‘because that’s what a benevolent person would do’. Rather, it is natural to 
think that the person who is genuinely virtuous chooses certain courses of  
action under other descriptions, such as that it is ‘the thing to 
do’ (McDowell 1970, p. 332) or because ‘she needs it’ (Williams 1985, p. 11). 
As Williams observes,  
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thinking about your possible states in terms of  the virtues…is not 
distinctively to think about the terms in which you could or 
should think about your actions: it is rather to think about the way 
in which others might describe on comment on the way in which 
you think about your actions, and if  that represents the essential 
content of  your deliberations, it really does seem a misdirection 
of  the ethical attention (Williams 1985, p. 12).  
A similar charge would apply to the feeling of  shame as it is envisaged by 
the account we are considering. Insofar as it manifests a concern not with 
what one has done or the person one has shown oneself  to be but with 
one’s public image it seems to involve a kind of  misdirection of  one’s 
ethical attention. Moreover, insofar as this concern with one’s public image 
plays a role in governing one’s action and ethical thinking, one will fail to 
rely on one’s own autonomous response to the ethically relevant 
characteristics of  the situation. This, in turn, suggests that the present 
strategy does not altogether avoid the charge of  problematic heteronomy, 
even if  the relevant failure is less extreme than the failure of  autonomy 
entailed by the standard social-evaluation view. 
In the absence of  a normatively satisfying middle way, we might feel 
inclined to reject the starting assumption that careful attention to the 
phenomenology of  shame seems to have both of  these starting 
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assumptions. For example, some who emphasise the idea that shame is a 
‘moral emotion’ reject the idea that it is a ‘social emotion’ (e.g. Deonna, 
Rodogno & Teroni 2011). By contrast, others who emphasise the idea that 
shame is a ‘social emotion’ reject the idea that it is a ‘moral emotion’ (e.g. 
Velleman 2001).  
The burden of  proof, however, is on these authors to show that the two-
dimensional characterisation of  shame I have offered is inaccurate. After all, 
the idea that shame has value-oriented and other-oriented dimensions is 
implicit in our ordinary thought and talk about shame, it is reflected in the 
characteristic behavioural expressions of  shame, and it is implicit in the 
classic definitions of  shame that have been offered throughout the history 
of  philosophy.  The problem with the arguments that are actually offered, 7
moreover, is they have tended to rest on the assumption that the only ways 
of  understanding the value-oriented and other-oriented dimensions of  
shame are those we have considered so far.  However, as I will now argue, 8
there is an alternative way of  thinking about shame which promises to 
provide a more satisfying integration of  shame’s two dimensions.  
 See Plato (Laws, 464e ff), Aristotle (Rhetoric,1383b15), Descartes (The Passions of  the Soul, §66) 7
and Spinoza, (Ethics, III, p. 58, Definitions of  the Emotions, 31). 
 For example, Deonna, Rodogno, & Teroni (2011) assume that the only way of  understanding 8
the other-oriented dimension of  shame is along the lines described in §2.1. On the other hand, 
Velleman’s rejection of  the value-oriented dimension of  shame only targets what he calls 
‘standard philosophical analyses of  shame’, namely the kind of  position considered in §§2.2-2.5.
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§3. Shame, Avoidance and Rejection 
  
3.1. An Alternative Approach 
The difficulties we have encountered can be avoided if  we reject the 
standard interpretation of  other-oriented dimension of  shame. Rather than 
thinking of  shame as manifesting a concern primarily with the way we 
appear to others, I suggest that the other-oriented dimension can be 
understood as manifesting our natural desire for interpersonal connection 
(§3.2). Then, on this basis, I will argue that it is plausible to understand the 
other-oriented dimension of  shame primarily in terms of  the notion of  
merited avoidance (or, in the extreme case, rejection) of  a specific form of  
interpersonal connection (§3.3). 
3.2. Interpersonal Connection 
Human sociality is distinctive in the way it is pervaded by a special form of  
communicative interaction. From infancy onwards we seek to communicate, 
in a broad but perfectly appropriate sense of  the word, through eye contact, 
joint attention and, at a later stage of  development, conversation. As many 
have observed, we seek to interact in these ways, not merely for the sake of  
‘the maximally effective exchange of  information’ and ‘such general 
purposes as influencing or directing the actions of  others’ (Grice 1989, p. 
28), but also, crucially, in order to connect with them.  9
 See, for example, Tronick (2005), Cockburn (2014), Taylor (2016) and Eilan (Forthcoming)9
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Although this notion of  connection is a familiar one, it has received little 
in the way of  philosophical scrutiny. Since a desire for interpersonal 
connection underlies the account of  shame I will defend, it is important to 
understand in more detail what it is. In order to do so, it is useful to take a 
step back and consider what it is like to be in the presence of  another 
human being, conscious that one is the object of  their attention. In 
situations of  this sort, one is conscious of  the other’s attention as having an 
immediate impact on one’s activity and emotional comportment. 
First, the other’s act of  attending to one is experienced as having an 
immediate impact on one’s activity insofar as it necessitates a 
communicative response on one’s part. If  they are looking at one, for 
example, one might acknowledge their gaze with a wave or a smile, one 
might ask them who they’re looking at or initiate a conversation. A response 
is necessitated since, even if  one avoids their gaze, this will itself  be a way 
of  registering their presence, a communicative response which takes effort. 
This response will provoke a communicative response from the other, in 
turn, even if  their response is similarly avoidant, in which case a mutually 
awkward silence will ensue (compare Korsgaard 1996, p. 140). As a 
consequence, both individuals become mutually oriented in their activity.  
Second being attended to in this way also has an emotional impact. Even 
on this austere description, it might evoke a feeling of  self-consciousness, 
aggression or excitement. If  we describe the case in more detail, paying 
careful attention to the other’s facial expression and their general 
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demeanour towards one, for example if  they are relating to one in a way 
expressive of  aggression, this is liable to make one feel afraid; a friendly 
gaze might evoke a response of  friendliness in return, and so forth. But 
even coldness, in this context, is not the absence of  a response; it is not, as 
Cavell (1969, p. 264) puts it, an ‘emotional blank’. 
We can understand the notion of  interpersonal connection against this 
background. When we try to connect with another, we are attempting to 
interact with them in the affectively-charged manner delineated above, and 
to do so in such a way that constitutes pleasant and harmonious form of  
emotional attunement. We might achieve connection in a variety of  
different ways, from the mutual expression of  interest in some object, topic 
or goal, to the shared immersion in one another characteristic of  mutual 
attraction. In this vein Eilan (Forthcoming, p. 14) writes of  
‘communication-as-connection’ as a basic psychological phenomenon which 
can be established though a variety of  joint activities such as by sharing a 
joke, dancing, playing music together, chanting, joint reminiscence, in 
addition to the activities already mentioned. Although much more needs to 
be said to elaborate and explain the notion of  interpersonal connection, the 
following points will suffice for present purposes.  
First, interpersonal connection can take relatively deep or superficial 
forms, depending on the manner in which each subject is affected by the 
other and the extent to which this reaction is visible to the other. At one 
end of  the spectrum, we might think of  the connection between two lovers 
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making eye contact or two friends engaged in a deep and meaningful 
conversation. At the other, we might think of  the friendly and sincere 
interactions between two strangers on a train. 
Second, for interpersonal connection to be achieved, it must be the case 
that both (a) the responses of  each person to the other are genuine 
expressions of  the way the other affects them and (b) that each is open to 
the other, attentive to the communicative acts the other is directing towards 
them. According to (a), cases in which either individual is not expressing 
their genuine reaction to the other will not count as cases of  interpersonal 
connection because they are not emotionally in tune. One person is masking 
their emotional reaction through pretense and, by doing so, preventing the 
other from making genuine affective contact with them. Similarly (b) 
precludes cases in which either party is inattentive to the other, as when one 
person is distracted or deep in thought. To the extent that either party is 
‘miles away’, it is difficult to make affective contact with them in the way 
characteristic of  interpersonal connection. It also precludes cases in which 
one fails to see the other as they are, instead seeing them though the lens of  
some preconception, bias or stereotype. 
Finally, it takes two to connect. A is connected with B at level Z if  and 
only if  B is connected with A at level Z. So if  A is hallucinating or 
otherwise mistakenly takes B to be connecting with them at this level when 
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they aren’t, this means they aren’t in fact connecting with one another. All 
we have here is the ‘mere appearance’ of  connection.  10
With this general understanding of  interpersonal connection in place, we 
can understand the other-oriented dimension of  shame as manifesting our 
desire primarily for interpersonal connection, and only secondarily a desire 
to appear in a positive light to others. To say our desire to appear well is 
secondary, in this way, is to suggest that we want to appear well for the sake 
of  interpersonal connection, since the way the way we appear to another, 
and particularly the evaluative light under which we appear to them, can 
enable or preclude interpersonal connection.  
The other’s positive appraisal will enable connection when it is expressed 
in a face to face interaction, making possible the kind of  pleasant and 
harmonious emotional attunement constitutive of  interpersonal connection. 
On the other hand, their negative appraisal, whether it be expressed by hate, 
anger or pity, can preclude connection in at least two ways. First, if  the 
negative evaluation is expressed in the interaction, it will preclude 
connection by bringing about a disharmonious form of  emotional 
attunement.  Alternatively, if  they hide their actual emotional response and 11
‘put a face on’ this will preclude connection insofar as it will result, at best, 
in the mere appearance of  connection. Positive appraisals too can 
sometimes preclude interpersonal connection. For example, one might feel 
 Compare, for example, Campbell (2005, p. 289) on joint attention. 10
 Tronick (2005) calls this ‘disconnection’. This name is unfortunate insofar as the notion of  11
disconnection is ambiguous between the cessation of  connection and the kind of  emotional 
discord he has in mind. 
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unable to connect with another if  one takes their good opinion of  one to 
be inappropriate, based on their ignorance, or on one’s deception of  them. 
As we will see, this last point is crucial in understanding the case of  Arthur 
Dimmesdale.  12
3.3. Avoidance, Rejection and Shamefulness 
With this in place, we can understand shame as manifesting our natural 
desire primarily for interpersonal connection. As social animals, we 
characteristically desire interpersonal connection. However, as distinctively 
value-oriented social animals, we desire appropriate interpersonal 
connection and therefore want to be the kind of  person that merits the 
other’s acceptance. 
On this basis, we can understand shame as follows. When we feel 
ashamed of  ourselves, we feel ourselves to be shameful in some regard. 
This can be understood to involve the experience of  feeling oneself  to 
merit avoidance or, in the extreme case, rejection, on the part of  the other. 
The relevant forms of  avoidance or rejection can be specified with 
reference to the notion of  interpersonal connection. For example, it can be 
said to involve feeling oneself  to have some property which merits 
avoidance (or rejection) by the other of  any effort on one’s own part to 
connect with them in some specific way.  The qualification to specific 13
 I am grateful to Cheshire Calhoun for helping me to be clearer about this (as well as much of  12
the material in §3.3).
 Shamefulness might therefore be understood as a ‘response-dependent’ property in the 13
manner of  Wiggins (1987) and McDowell (1985). 
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forms of  connection is important, because some properties might only be 
felt to merit avoidance from (or rejection of) specific forms of  interpersonal 
connection. For example, one might feel ashamed of  one’s body, 
experiencing it as rendering one appropriately-avoidable for sexual 
interaction, but not for other forms of  interpersonal connection. If  one’s 
shortcoming is felt to be sufficiently egregious, however, it might be 
experienced as making appropriate a more global form of  avoidance. 
Consider how a child might come to apprehend certain things as being 
shameful. They will do so by first becoming acquainted with this form of  
avoidance or rejection by being subjected to it themselves (by being ignored, 
kept at a distance or sent out of  the room when they misbehave, being 
teased by their peers, etc.), by observing others who are subjected to this 
avoidance or rejection, and by being told stories or anecdotes in which 
certain kinds of  people are avoided or shunned for certain sorts of  reasons. 
As they gradually internalise the standards and norms of  their culture, they 
will come to recognise that certain things constitute not simply causes, but 
also reasons, for avoidance and rejection. These responses and standards, 
becoming internalised, will form a part of  the subject’s ethical self-
understanding, their conception of  themselves as a certain kind of  person 
with certain kinds of  commitments. This will involve forming the capacity 
to apprehend and respond to certain properties and acts as being 
shameful.  14
 For an empirically informed account of  human ethical development, see Tomasello (2019). 14
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This account is able to acknowledge both the value-oriented and other- 
oriented dimensions of  shame. When one feels ashamed of  oneself, one 
feels oneself  to merit social avoidance or rejection by others. This sense of  
rejection is foregrounded by Hawthorne when writes of  Hester Prynne that: 
‘Every gesture, every word, and even the silence of  those with whom she 
came in contact, implied, and often expressed, that she was 
banished’ (Hawthorne 2007, p. 68). Her scarlet letter is intended to signal to 
all with whom she comes into contact that she should be shunned, that she 
is an outcast. When Hester feels shame upon being ‘banished’ by others, she 
experiences herself  as meriting their avoidance or rejection, and the painful 
emotional experience she undergoes in response to this can be understood 
as a manifestation of  her desire for connection with others.  
On the other hand, this account is able to do justice to the secret shame 
of  Arthur Dimmesdale. Arthur feels himself  to be shameful, though 
nobody knows he is the father of  Hester’s child. This is because he takes 
himself  to merit rejection. The apparent episodes of  connection he seems 
to achieve with his parishioners are only  merely apparent, based on his wilful 
deception of  them and, later, on their wilful blindness to his revealed 
character. For Arthur it is ‘all falsehood! — all emptiness!’ (Hawthorne 
2007, p. 150). Arthur’s shame, like Hester’s, can therefore be understood as a 
manifestation of  his desire for interpersonal connection. However, in this 
instance, the reason his interactions with others do not take the harmonious 
form constitutive of  connection is because, feeling himself  to merit their 
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avoidance and rejection, he is unable to accept their approbation or their 
social overtures; they are felt by him to rest on their ignorance of  his true 
character, to the ‘front’ he puts on rather than the person he considers 
himself  to be. 
Furthermore, this account is well positioned to accommodate cases of  
shame which are felt in solitude. Robinson Crusoe might continue to feel 
shame, even in moments where he is acutely conscious of  the fact that there 
is nobody around to engage and connect with. If  he does, this will be 
because, as a value-oriented social creature, he continues to desire 
appropriate interpersonal connection, and therefore to be an appropriate 
partner for this kind of  connection. His shameful deeds and features will 
continue to pain him in the characteristic manner of  shame since they are 
felt to render him an appropriate object of  avoidance and rejection. 
Before moving on it is worth noting that nothing I have said entails that, 
if  one feels ashamed of  some aspect of  oneself, then either (a) one actually 
expects others to avoid one in the relevant way or (b) one thinks it would be 
inappropriate for them not to avoid or reject us in that specific way. 
Consider a case of  shame where the putatively shameful property is not 
some serious normative violation that would result in or justify outright 
abandonment but some relatively minor shortcoming. This might be the 
poor quality of  one’s clothing, the shape of  one's nose, or the fact one has 
one arm significantly shorter than the other. Being ashamed of  these things, 
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I suggest, involves feeling them to merit avoidance of  a specific kind of  
interpersonal connection.  
However, this does not entail (a) one expects others to actually avoid one 
upon becoming aware of  the relevant property. The reason for this is simply 
that we often have reason to expect others not to do what we take them to 
have good reason to do. Even if  we think they have good reason to avoid or 
reject us, for example, we might nevertheless expect that their friendship, 
love or affection for us will motivate them to look past these things. 
More importantly, (b) is false. It is reasonable to think that although 
taking a property to be shameful involves taking it to be such as to render 
avoidance or rejection appropriate, this does not entail taking it to render 
any particular instance interpersonal connection inappropriate, all things 
considered. One reason for this is that even if  we think that it would be 
appropriate for them to avoid us, this does not obviously commit us to 
thinking that it would be inappropriate for them not to avoid us in this case. 
This inference might be rejected by someone who insists that the relevant 
reason to avoid in this particular case is ‘non-insistent’ rather than ‘insistent’. 
While the presence of  either type of  reason renders a certain response 
appropriate, it might be said, only the presence of  an insistent reason 
renders the absence of  that response inappropriate. As Kolodny (2003, p. 
163) suggests, ‘insistent reasons require a response, whereas non-insistent 
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reasons leave it optional’.  However, even those who are reluctant to 15
endorse the idea of  a non-insistent ought to reject (b). After all, although 
the relevant property is such as to make connection inappropriate, this 
might be outweighed by a variety of  other factors which leave the other 
with an all-things-considered reason to connect with one. 
3.4. Is Shame an Immature Emotion?  
In §2.1 we saw that thinking of  the other-oriented dimension of  shame in 
terms of  a desire to be seen in a certain way by others naturally leads to the 
worry that shame is a superficial, narcissistic and heteronomous emotion. In 
different ways, the accounts considered in §2 failed to assuage these worries. 
However, if  we think of  shame as manifesting our concern primarily for 
interpersonal connection these issues dissipate. 
This is most apparent in connection with the charges of  superficiality 
and narcissism. Shame, so far from being a superficial emotion, is 
understood on this account as manifesting a concern with one of  the richest 
forms of  human experience. For the same reason, if  shame is understood in 
this way it is not open to the charge of  being an inherently narcissistic 
emotion. When we feel shame our attention is not typically focused on 
 Note that by claiming that in some cases the reason to avoid or reject can be non-insistent, we 15
do not commit to the claim that shamefulness only ever provides non-insistent reasons for 
avoidance or rejection. Rather, it is open for us to allow that the relevant reason might be insist 
ent or non-insistent depending on the nature and seriousness of  the relevant normative 
shortcoming, as well as other factors of  the situation. Moreover it may be that there are no 
codifiable rules or general principles that can be applied to determine which kind of  reason is 
present in a particular case (compare McDowell’s 1970 observations on the uncodifiability of  
adult moral outlooks). 
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ourselves; rather, it is focused primarily on those others with whom we 
desire to connect, by whom we feel it would be appropriate for us to be 
avoided or rejected, and by whom we are perhaps currently being avoided or 
rejected. Even insofar as we have a desire to be the kind of  person who is 
worthy of  interpersonal connection, the reason for this is that we want to 
connect with others and not because we have a narcissistic fixation on our 
public image. 
Similarly, although our need for connection and vulnerability to rejection 
constitutes a form of  dependence on others, this dependence does not 
constitute an obviously problematic failure of  autonomy. In particular, 
insofar as this account emphasises that idea that feeling ashamed of  
something involves feeling it to be appropriate grounds for avoidance or 
rejection, it is compatible with the thought that one’s feeling of  shame can 
be shaped by one’s own, autonomous, judgement as to what merits such 
avoidance or rejection. It therefore does not present shame as necessarily 
involving the uncritical assimilation of  another person's conception of  
one.  16
 Even the fact that one suffers from ‘recalcitrant’ shame does not necessarily entail the 16
accusation that one irrational or heteronomous person. For example, I might feel ashamed of  my 
body-type after being subject to the ridicule of  others, even though I know that this is not really 
shameful and that the others’ norms reflect toxic and outdated beauty standards. In feeling 
recalcitrant shame, I have arguably fallen short of  the ideals of  rationality and autonomy. 
However, all this entails is that I am not ideally rational or autonomous; it does not entail that I 
am thereby blameworthy or criticisable. Moreover, this is straightforwardly compatible with the 
allowance that I’m at least as rational and autonomous as any ordinary person can be reasonably 
expected to be, and perhaps more so. This undermines a complaint made in different ways by 
Calhoun (2004, p. 136-7) and O’Brien (2020, p. 550-553), which some might be tempted to make 
against the account outlined here. 
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§4. Conclusion 
In this paper I have tried to establish two general claims. First, I have argued 
that understanding the relationship between the value-oriented and other-
oriented dimensions of  shame constitutes a serious philosophical challenge. 
And, second, I have argued that thinking of  the other-oriented dimension 
of  shame in terms of  the notions of  interpersonal connection and merited 
avoidance and rejection provides a more promising line of  response to this 
challenge than any of  the accounts considered in §2. Although there is 
much more to be said in elaboration of  the notion of  interpersonal 
connection on which my account of  shame rests, I hope that the 
attractiveness of  this account will encourage us in the belief  that this work 
is worthwhile.  17
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